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INSURANCE LAW
I. ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE OFFER OF UNDERINSURED
MOTORIST COVERAGE DETERMINED
In 1978 the South Carolina General Assembly enacted sec-
tion 56-9-831 of the South Carolina Code' requiring automobile
insurance carriers to offer underinsured motorist coverage to its
insureds. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Wannamaker2 is the first South Carolina case to determine what
constitutes an effective offer within the meaning of this section.
By adopting the four-prong test formulated by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Hastings v. United Pacific Insurance Co.,
3
the supreme court placed South Carolina in line with the only
other two states that have addressed this issue.4 The court held
that defendant State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. (State Farm)
did not make a meaningful offer by sending plaintiff Wan-
namaker a renewal notice accompanied by a booklet describing
underinsured motorist coverage. The court, by operation of law,
provided Wannamaker with underinsured motorist coverage.
On August 19, 1984, Wannamaker, a South Carolina resi-
dent, received by mail from State Farm a renewal notice for his
automobile liability policies and a stuffer booklet detailing un-
derinsured motorist coverage. Wannamaker did not read the
booklet, nor was he informed about underinsured motorist cov-
erage when he went to his agent's office to renew his policies.
Subsequently, Wannamaker's minor daughter was killed in an
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-831 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986). This section was amended
by 1987 S.C. Acts 155 and has been recodified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-160 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1987), effective June 4, 1987. The amended section merely deletes one sentence
that states, "Coverage on any other vehicles may not be added to that coverage." There-
fore, the new amendment will not affect the holding of this survey case.
2. 291 S.C. 518, 354 S.E.2d 555 (1987). The court also addressed the issue of
whether an insured may stack underinsured motorist coverage when neither of the in-
sured's vehicles is involved in the accident. Pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-831 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1986), the court held that no stacking was allowed. Id. at 522, 354 S.E.2d at
557.
3. 318 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1982).
4. Id. at 849-53; Tucker v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 125 ]M. App. 3d 329, 465 N.E.2d
956 (1984).
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automobile accident that did not involve Wannamaker's insured
vehicles. The driver responsible for the daughter's death did not
have adequate insurance to compensate Wannamaker for his
loss. 5
The supreme court, in accord with Garris v. Cincinnati In-
surance Co.," held that section 56-9-831 places the burden of of-
fering underinsured motorist coverage upon the insurer, reason-
ing that "the statute mandates the insured to be provided with
adequate information, and in such a manner, as to allow the in-
sured to make an intelligent decision of whether to accept or
reject the coverage." The court adopted the four-part test for-
mulated in Hastings8 as a reasonable standard by which to de-
termine if the insurer has met its statutory burden."
The supreme court found that State Farm did not make a
verbal offer to Wannamaker when he renewed his policies at his
agent's office. The court then quoted from the Minnesota Su-
preme Court decision of Kuchenmeister v. Illinois Farmers In-
surance Co.,10 which held that a vague message concerning un-
derinsured motorist coverage printed on the bottom of a
premium notice was not a meaningful offer. 1 The court con-
cluded from this line of reasoning that State Farm did not make
a meaningful offer, and therefore, the court provided underin-
sured motorist coverage by operation of law.
The first requirement of the Hastings test mandates that an
"insurer's notification process must be commercially reasonable,
whether oral or in writing."12 Courts have recognized the mail as
a commercially reasonable means of notification.' In fact, the
5. Record at 7-8.
6. Garris v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 280 S.C. 149, 311 S.E.2d 723 (1984).
7. 291 S.C. at 521, 354 S.E.2d at 556.
8. 318 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1982).
9. 291 S.C. at 521, 354 S.E.2d at 556. The South Carolina Supreme Court adopted
the Hastings test as requiring that: "(1) the insurer's notification process must be com-
mercially reasonable, whether oral or in writing; (2) the insurer must specify the limits of
optional coverage and not merely offer additional coverage in general terms; (3) the in-
surer must intelligently advise the insured of the nature of the optional coverage; and (4)
the insured must be told that optional coverages are available for an additional pre-
mium." Id.
10. 310 N.W.2d 86 (Minn. 1981). The applicable Minnesota statute required the
insurer to offer underinsured motorist coverage to its insured.
11. Id. at 88.
12. 291 S.C. at 521, 354 S.E.2d at 556.
13. See Tucker v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 125 Ill. App. 3d 329, 465 N.E.2d 956
[Vol. 40
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insured may not actually have received the notification as long
as the method used is deemed commercially reasonable. 14 More-
over, personal notification by the insurer may not be required. 5
In the instant case, State Farm notified Wannamaker by mail,
which seemingly is a commercially reasonable method. The first
requirement apparently was satisfied.
According to the second requirement, "[T]he insurer must
specify the limits of optional coverage and not merely offer addi-
tional coverage in general terms. '1 6 This requirement may be
satisfied by a statement advising the insured that underinsured
motorist coverage is available for limits equal to the insured's
bodily injury limits.17 Although this requirement does not man-
date "that all offers be given in numerical form to be satisfac-
tory," 8 the State Farm booklet did numerically indicate the
available limits of underinsured motorist coverage. Clearly, State
Farm met or exceeded the demands of the second requirement.
As in Hastings, the critical concern in the instant case was
whether the booklet satisfied the third requirement. This third
factor requires that the insurer "intelligibly advise the insured
of the nature of the optional coverage."19 Prior to concluding
that the booklet was not a meaningful offer, the supreme court
cited Kuchenmeister, ° in which the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the following language failed to satisfy the third re-
quirement: "Did you know that you may now have underinsured
motorist and/or uninsured motorist coverage in amounts up to
your bodily injury limits? If interested, contact your agent."2
The State Farm booklet describes the policy limits of underin-
sured motorist coverage and explains the reasons for obtaining
(1984); Squier v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 356 N.W.2d 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
14. See Orolin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 585 F. Supp. 97, 100 (N.D. Ill.
1984). The applicable Illinois statute also required the insurer to offer its insured under-
insured motorist coverage. See also Jacobson v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 264 N.W.2d
804, 807-08 (Minn. 1978) (Minnesota statute required only that the insurer make under-
insured motorist coverage available).
15. Squier, 356 N.W.2d at 835.
16. 291 S.C. at 521, 354 S.E.2d at 556.
17. See Henrickson v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 364 N.W.2d 896, 899 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985); See also Orolin, 585 F. Supp. at 101-02.
18. Erickson ex rel. Erickson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985).
19. 291 S.C. at 521, 354 S.E.2d at 556.
20. 310 N.W.2d 86 (Minn. 1981).
21. Id. at 88.
1988]
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such coverage. The booklet certainly provides more information
than the Kuchenmeister notice. Because of the factual dissimi-
larity between the instant notice and the Kuchenmeister notice,
the reasoning behind the court's decision seems inappropriate.
The language contained within the State Farm booklet certainly
seemed to "intelligibly advise the insured" of his options.
There may have been a doubt, however, as to the adequacy
of the booklet's headline. The trial court had emphasized that
the booklet was "lamely entitled 'Important Information About
Coverages U and W.'" "This headline," continued the trial
court, "obviously did not attract the attention of Wannamaker,
for it is stipulated he did not read the stuffer. 2 2 The trial court
then concluded that because the stuffer was not "calculated" to
attract Wannamaker's attention, State Farm failed to fulfill its
statutory burden s.2 By constrast, in an analogous case, an insert
heading in bold print that was entitled "Important Information
About Your Uninsured Motorist Limits" was held to satisfy the
statutory burden.24
The conclusory nature of the court's decision makes difficult
the determination of several questions relevant to this issue. It is
unclear, for example, whether the court failed to find a meaning-
ful offer because of the booklet's vague heading or because the
booklet's language may have been too vague and confusing. An-
other unanswered question is whether there can ever be an effec-
tive offer if the insured is illiterate or so ignorant as to be unable
to understand even the simplest written notice. Assuming the
insured is literate and the notice is sufficiently descriptive, the
decision does not address whether the insured has an affirmative
duty to read. Provided the statutory requirement of an offer of
underinsured coverage remains in effect, future litigation is inev-
itable on these issues.
The final requirement as formulated by the supreme court
mandates that "the insured must be told that optional coverages
are available for an additional premium."25 State Farm clearly
22. Record at 22.
23. Id. at 23.
24. Erickson ex rel. Erickson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 N.W.2d 427, 431 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985). The court applied the Hastings test to uninsured motorist coverage. The
court also emphasized that the bold heading on the notice was followed by a straight-
forward description of uninsured motorist coverage.
25. 291 S.C. at 521, 354 S.E.2d at 556. The Hastings court, by contrast, stated that
[Vol. 40
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satisfied this requirement. The State Farm booklet "contained a
table which set forth the semi-annual premium for each availa-
ble level of Underinsured Motorist Coverage up to $100,000/
$300,000.
''26
Apparently, the Wannamaker court held that the State
Farm booklet did not constitute meaningful offer because the
booklet did not adequately advise the insured of his options. As
a result, the court provided Wannamaker underinsured motorist
coverage by operation of law. The court's holding may be inter-
preted to indicate that unless an insurer's notification is clearly
written and designed to attract the insured's attention, the in-
surer will fail to satisfy its statutory obligation. Such a subjec-
tive standard by its very nature creates uncertainty. Until this
confusion is resolved, insurers would be well advised to notify its
insureds personally and carefully document such notification. 7
Uncertainty will persist until the supreme court upholds a writ-
ten notification, thereby providing a model for insurers to follow.
G. Scott Lutz
II. INSURER MUST SHOW CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN A Loss
AND AN EXCLUSION TO LIMIT COVERAGE OF POLICY
South Carolina Insurance Guaranty Association v.
Broach is the South Carolina Supreme Court's most recent and
most definitive statement on insurance policy exclusions. South
Carolina insurers should be aware of the decision since it firmly
rejects the majority rule29 by holding that an insurer must show
a causal connection between a loss and an exclusion before the
exclusion will limit coverage under the policy.
the insured must be informed that underinsured motorist coverages "are available for a
relatively modest increase in premiums." 318 N.W.2d at 853. The South Carolina Su-
preme Court thus apparently sought to avoid litigation concerning the question of
whether a particular premium was "relatively modest."
26. Brief of Appellant at 10.
27. Personal notification is recommended as the safest method despite decisions
stating that personal notification is not required. See, e.g., Orolin v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 585 F. Supp. 97, 100 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Squier v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 356
N.W.2d 832, 835 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). In Wannamaker the court specifically stated
that had State Farm orally notified the insured, its statutory burden would have been
satisfied. 291 S.C. at 521, 354 S.E.2d at 556.
28. 291 S.C. 349, 353 S.E.2d 450 (1987).
29. See cases cited infra note 31.
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Appellee Broach's aircraft was lost at sea while being flown
by a licensed student pilot. The student pilot, however, had not
obtained approval from his instructor prior to takeoff, contrary
to the provisions of the exclusionary clause of the aircraft insur-
ance policy.30 Hence, the appellant insurer denied coverage. The
United States District Court, holding that the insurer had failed
to show a causal connection between the exclusion and the loss,
found in favor of Broach. On appeal the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals certified to the South Carolina Supreme Court the
question of the necessity of a causal connection.
The court, in a brief but unwavering opinion, expressly re-
jected the majority rule exemplified in Di Santo v. Enstrom He-
licopter Corp." that an insurance exclusion remains effective de-
spite the lack of a causal relationship between the provision and
the loss. Instead, the court embraced what it called the "modern
trend," which it claimed developed from a line of South Carolina
cases ruling that liability cannot be avoided unless the loss is
actually a result of some or all of the exclusionary provisions in
automobile and life insurance policies.3 2 In 1977 the rule was ap-
plied in an aircraft insurance case, South Carolina Insurance
Co. v. Collins.3 The rationale was that "when the parties made
30. This policy does not apply . . . to any occurrence or to any loss or damage
occurring while the aircraft is operated in flight by other than the pilot or pilots set forth
under Item 7 of the Declarations." Item 7 of the Declarations stated, "Only the following
pilot or pilots holding valid and effective pilot and medical certificates with ratings as
required by the Federal Aviation Administration for the flight involved will operate the
aircraft in flight: See Endorsement #2." Endorsement #2 stated, in the relevant part,
that a student pilot must be under the direct supervision of a properly qualified FAA
certified flight instructor who must specifically approve each flight of the student prior to
takeoff. 291 S.C. at 350, 353 S.E.2d at 450-51.
31. 489 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Di Santo cited other holdings supporting
the majority view: Hollywood Flying Serv., Inc. v. Compass Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 507 (5th
Cir. 1979); Arnold v. Globe Indem. Co., 416 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1969); Bruce v. Lumber-
mens Mut. Casualty Co., 222 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1955); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Urner, 264 Md. 660, 287 A.2d 764 (1972); Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 883
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 189
Neb. 610, 204 N.W.2d 162 (1973). 489 F. Supp. at 1364-65.
32. See Johnson v. South State Ins. Co., 287 S.C. 259, 341 S.E.2d 793 (1986); Out-
law v. Calhoun Life Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 199, 119 S.E.2d 685 (1961); Young v. Life & Casu-
alty Ins. Co. of Tenn., 204 S.C. 386, 29 S.E.2d 482 (1944); Smith v. Sovereign Camp
Woodmen of the World, 204 S.C. 193, 28 S.E.2d 808 (1944); Bailey v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 185 S.C. 169, 193 S.E. 638 (1937); McGee v. Globe Indem. Co., 173
S.C. 380, 175 S.E. 849 (1934).
33. 269 S.C. 282, 237 S.E.2d 358 (1977).
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the contract of insurance, they were not inserting a mere arbi-
trary provision, but that it was the purpose of the insurance
company to relieve itself of liability from accidents caused by
the excluded condition.
''34
The reasoning seems valid on the surface, but the opinion
does not stand up to closer scrutiny. The "modern trend" em-
braced so readily by the court is not modern at all. It is based
almost entirely on automobile and life insurance cases from the
1930s and 1940s. Furthermore, the jurisdictions following this
so-called trend are few, 5 and there is no indication that the sta-
tistics are changing.
There may be a strong public policy argument for allowing
the recovery of benefits in some cases, such as when the policy
exclusion is based on laws or circumstances that the insured
could not reasonably be expected to understand or foresee .
This policy argument, however, should not apply to aircraft
cases because the insured easily can control access to the aircraft
and thereby ensure that policy provisions are met.
In Collins37 the court justified itself by deciding that the
purpose of an exclusionary clause is to prevent accidents arising
from the precluded circumstances. The court assumed that, oth-
erwise, the exclusion would be arbitrary. This assumption is un-
sound. The insurer is justified in its desire to limit its liability to
situations that are reasonably foreseeable; these limitations will
be reflected in the premium paid. In this sense, then, the exclu-
sions are not arbitrary but are the result of objective calculation.
Therefore, a ruling against an exclusion that is clear and unam-
biguous would result in a judicial rewriting of the contract. This
approach ignores factors such as risk-spreading, predictability,
and the cost of litigation over the causation question. 3
At the federal level, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has
sided with the insurer on this issue. In Bruce v. Lumberman's
Mutual Casualty Co.39 the United States District Court held,
and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, 0 that the insurer need not
34. Id. at 291, 237 S.E.2d at 361-62.
35. Di Santo v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 489 F. Supp. 1352. (E.D. Pa. 1980).
36. E.g., Reynolds v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 166 S.C. 214, 164 S.E. 602 (1932).
37. 269 S.C. 282, 237 S.E.2d 358 (1977).
38. Di Santo, 489 F. Supp. at 1365.
39. 127 F. Supp. 124 (E.D.N.C. 1954).
40. 222 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1955).
19881
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show a causal connection between a breach of an exclusion and
an accident so long as the insurance contract does not contra-
vene public policy and the terms of the policy are plain and un-
ambiguous. This same result was reached by a variety of state
courts.4 1
The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, deemed un-
persuasive the overwhelming number of cases opposing its view.
"Only their number, and not their reasoning, lends support to a
reversal here. ' 42 Yet the majority's reasoning appears more logi-
cal than that of the South Carolina court. An insurance policy is
a contract. It is made at arm's length by parties each offering
some form of consideration. Each party is free to bargain for
what it wants to include as terms of the contract. When a term
is clearly understandable and legally sound, the court's duty is
to construe the term as it is incorporated into the contract, not
to interpret it to avoid hardship to a party. If a party or a court
finds the practice of using aircraft insurance policy exclusions
repugnant, its proper forum for challenging their propriety is the
South Carolina Legislature. Therefore, the court's holding, that
the insurer needs to show a causal connection between the ex-
clusion and Broach's loss, resulted in a blatant rewriting of a
plain and unambiguous term in the insurance contract.
Kim Scim6
41. See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg v. Estate of Meyer, 192 Cal
App, 3d 866, 237 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1987); Security Mut. Casualty Co. v. O'Brien, 99 N.M.
638, 662 P.2d 639 (1983); Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Alfa Aviation, Inc., 61 N.C.
App. 544, 300 S.E.2d 877 (1983); Ochs v. Avemco Ins. Co., 54 Or. App. 768, 636 P.2d 421
(1981).
42. South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Collins, 269 S.C. 282, 292, 237 S.E.2d 358, 362 (1977).
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